The challenge of long-lived alpha emitters in the Chalk River legacy wastes

January 22, 2024 (revised September 17, 2024)

Why is so little Chalk River waste suitable for near surface disposal? 

Extensive research work at the Chalk River Laboratories on nuclear reactor fuels, and in the early days, on materials for nuclear weapons, produced waste with large quantities of long-lived alpha emitters.  This waste is difficult to manage and can even become increasingly radioactive over time.  

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, because of the presence of long-lived alpha emitters, waste from nuclear research facilities is generally classified as intermediate level, and even in some cases, as high level. This waste cannot be put in a near surface disposal facility because its radioactivity will not decay to harmless levels during the period that the facility remains under institutional control.   

Alpha emitters decay by throwing off an alpha particle, the equivalent of a helium nucleus, with two protons and two neutrons.  The external penetrating power of an alpha particle is low, but alpha emitters have extremely serious health effects if ingested or inhaled. They can lodge in your lungs and cause cancer.

Research at Chalk River and all other nuclear laboratories is ultimately based on three long-lived alpha emitters — thorium-232, uranium-235, and uranium-238. These are the “naturally occurring” or “primordial” radionuclides.  They were created by large stars and then incorporated into the Earth and the solar system when they formed some 4.5 billion years ago.  The waste inventory proposed by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories for the Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) includes over six tons each of thorium-232 and uranium-238.

Each “natural” alpha emitter initiates a decay chain with roughly a dozen radioactive isotopes of other elements such as radium, radon, and polonium.  These elements also occur naturally, but in much smaller amounts because of their more rapid decay. 

When a radioactive element releases an alpha particle, the atomic weight of the product goes down by four.  Uranium-238 decays to uranium-234, with a 245,000-year half-life. Uranium-234 decays to thorium-230, with a 75,000-year half-life. Thorium-230 decays to radium-226, with a 1,600-year half-life.  Shorter half-lives mean greater initial radioactivity. Radium-226 decays to radon-222, with a 4-day half-life.  Radon-222, a gas, builds up in the basements of houses built over uranium-rich rocks.  When it is inhaled it decays into polonium-218, a highly toxic, cancer-causing substance with a 3-day half-life. “Naturally occurring” alpha emitters are clearly harmful.

Hazards increase when uranium and thorium are mined and concentrated from ores and used in their pure form.  Marie Curie, who spent much of her career isolating radium and polonium from uranium, died of radiation-induced leukemia at age 66. She was buried in a lead-lined tomb because her corpse emitted so much radiation.

When thorium-232, uranium-235, and uranium-238 are irradiated in a reactor, as at Chalk River, they absorb neutrons and produce significant quantities of new, man-made, long-lived alpha-emitters.  Irradiated uranium-238 absorbs a neutron and temporarily forms uranium-239.  Uranium-239 transmutes to neptunium-239, which quickly transmutes to long-lived plutonium-239, with a half-life of 24,000 years. 

Plutonium-239 is “fissile” – it can readily support a chain reaction.  It is what the early Chalk River researchers produced for the manufacture of U.S. nuclear weapons, by separating the plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel.  They also used the separated plutonium to make “mixed oxide” (MOX) reactor fuel, mixing it with fresh uranium.

Thorium-232, when put in a nuclear reactor, will absorb a neutron and transmute to uranium-233, with a half-life of 160,000 years.  Uranium-233 also can support a chain reaction, so it can be used in atomic bombs and reactor fuels as well. Chalk River researchers did a lot of work to separate uranium-233 from irradiated thorium-232.

All reactor fuel contains uranium-235.  It is the only naturally occurring isotope that readily undergoes fission and can sustain a chain reaction.  But not all uranium-235 atoms undergo fission in a nuclear reactor.  Instead they can absorb either one or two neutrons and form yet two more very long-lived, man-made alpha-emitters, uranium-236 (half-life of 23.4 million years) and neptunium-237 (half-life of 2.14 million years). 

Nuclear engineers don’t like uranium-236 because it acts as a “neutron poison”, absorbing neutrons instead of undergoing fission.  The longer that uranium-235 fuel remains in a reactor, the more uranium-236 and neptunium-237 are produced. 

Uranium-236 is certainly a part of the Chalk River waste. It is the longest-lived of all the man-made alpha emitters, but for some reason it was omitted from the NSDF inventory.

As noted above, thorium-232, uranium-235, and uranium-238 are the start of three naturally occurring decay chains.  A fourth decay chain starts with man-made neptunium-237 and ends with thallium-205 (the element before lead in the periodic table).  Neptunium and its “progeny” have all decayed away during Earth’s 4.5-billion-year history, but production of neptunium-237 in nuclear reactors (and uranium-233 by thorium-232 irradiation) has “resurrected” this hitherto extinct fourth decay chain.  

Americium-241, found in significant quantities in Chalk River waste, is another starting point for the man-made nepturium-237 decay chain.  Nuclear reactors have also greatly augmented the amounts of radionuclides in the uranium-235 decay chain by producing plutonium-239, and in the thorium-232 decay chain by producing uranium-236.

Early research done at Chalk River to extract (or “reprocess”) plutonium-239 and uranium-233 from irradiated fuel and irradiated thorium targets has created a legacy of buildings (e.g., the Plutonium Recovery Laboratory) and soils (e.g., the Thorium Pit) that are contaminated with long-lived alpha emitters.  Reprocessing was dangerous and caused several accidents. The resulting contamination has never been cleaned up.

Until 2018, highly enriched uranium-235 targets were irradiated in the NRU reactor at Chalk River, followed by dissolving the targets in nitric acid and extracting the fission product molybdenum-99, a “medical isotope”. After extraction of “moly-99”, the other fission products, and the long-lived alpha emitters uranium-236 and neptunium-237 (produced when uranium-235 atoms absorb neutrons instead of undergoing fission), remain in the medical isotope waste.  This waste resembles high-level spent fuel waste and represents one of Chalk River’s most dangerous legacies.

Fuel reprocessing, medical isotope production, and other research activities at Chalk River have produced very significant amounts of waste containing ­­long-lived alpha emitters.  This waste is unsuitable for near-surface disposal.  Much of it is mixed with shorter-lived fission products and cannot be separated from them.  This mixed waste should not be put in the NSDF. 

Detecting alpha emitters in mixed waste is expensive and challenging. Putting inadequately characterized waste in the NSDF would invalidate its safety case.

Unfortunately, the NSDF Project lacks adequate waste characterization procedures.  If the project is allowed to proceed, workers and future Ottawa valley residents could be exposed to unknown quantities of long-lived alpha emitters and suffer the serious health effects associated with them.

~~~~~~~~~~

NSDF project description February 2016

Five months after signing its contract and assuming control of Canada’s federal nuclear sites, CNL issued a project description for the NSDF that indicated a preferred location for the NSDF. The reasons given for the site being more suitable did not include minimizing the effect on biodiversity. It’s also important to note that the third reason is incorrect as the chosen NSDF site is a virgin forested hillside extraordinarily rich in biodiversity.

Excerpt:

The EMR Site is currently considered to be more suitable for the NSDF. The advantages of the
EMR Site include:
 Environmental: Shorter travel distance for trucks delivering waste to the NSDF from the CRL
campus where the vast majority of new waste will be generated. By road, the EMR Site is
approximately 4 km closer to the campus than the Alternate Site. Similarly, the EMR Site is
2-3 km closer to interim waste stores that will be moved to the NSDF. As such fuel
consumption and exhaust emissions associated with transport vehicles will be significantly
less for the EMR Site.
 Safety and Security: Shorter travel distance and therefore shorter response times for CRL
emergency crews responding to calls for assistance (e.g. fire, security). Emergency vehicles
are situated at the edge of the main CRL campus.
 Stewardship: Minimizes use of virgin (undeveloped) property at CRL by establishing NSDF in
the same vicinity as most of the existing WMAs and reduces the area of the CRL site that
will require long-term management and institutional control.

NSDF site selection studies

Near Surface Disposal Facility Site Selection Report Revision 2 (October 2016)

Very Low Level Waste Site Selection Report Revision 1 (January 2016 )

Biodiversity review for the Near Surface Disposal Facility Revision 0 (2016 November 29)

Project Description for the NSDF (February 2016)

LNC mettra-t-elle des composants de réacteurs nucléaires dans l’IGDPS?

le 12 août, 2024

LNC mettra-t-elle des composants de réacteurs nucléaires dans l’IGDPS?

Le manque de clarté quant à la nature des déchets destinés à être éliminés dans l’IGDPS est un sujet de préoccupation depuis la publication de la description du projet IGDPS en mars 2016.  Dans les commentaires de notre groupe sur la description du projet, soumis en juin 2016, nous avons déclaré

Pour que le public dispose d’informations adéquates sur la nature des déchets radioactifs qu’il est proposé d’inclure dans l’IGDPS, l’évaluation environnementale doit fournir beaucoup plus de détails que le simple fait d’indiquer que les déchets “devront satisfaire aux critères d’acceptation des déchets.”

LNC a préparé un document, Critères d’acceptation des déchets (CAD), qui, selon LNC, “assurera la protection à court et à long terme du public, de l’environnement et des travailleurs”.  Mais est-ce vrai ?  Et les Critères d’acceptation des déchets  permettent-ils à CNL de placer des composants de réacteurs dans l’IGDPS?

La calandre provenant de l’accident du réacteur NRX en décembre 1952 et deux calandres du réacteur NRU sont enfouies à faible profondeur dans les zones de gestion des déchets des Laboratoires de Chalk River.  Ceci est indiqué dans le Plan général de déclassement et de nettoyage des Laboratoires de Chalk River

“Plusieurs enfouissements spéciaux (calandres des NRU et NRX) ont également été effectués dans des conteneurs en béton ou directement dans les tranchées.”

Les CAD permet l’élimination des déchets classés comme Type 6 – Déchets surdimensionnés:

“Débris surdimensionnés, notamment les déchets qui n’entrent pas dans la définition des déchets des types 1 à 5, principalement en raison de leur taille ou de leur forme. On a recours au processus applicable aux activités effectuées peu fréquemment (section 6.4) pour approuver la mise en place des déchets de type 6.”

Section 6.4, Activités effectuées peu fréquemment, fait office de clause dérogatoire. Il stipule que: 

“L’admissibilité des déchets qui ne répondent pas à toutes les exigences énoncées dans les CAD (y compris les déchets de type 6, Déchets surdimensionnés) peut être évaluée au cas par cas.”

Les calandres des réacteurs dépasseraient presque certainement les “Limites de débit de dose et moyens pour manipuler et transférer” du tableau 7 des CAD.  Toutefois, les critères d’acceptation des déchets autorisent le dépassement de ces limites de dose si les colis de déchets sont blindés:

“Les colis de déchets blindés pourraient être utilisés pour s’assurer que les déchets respectent la limite de débit de dose indiquée dans le tableau 7.”

CNL a fait une présentation au Conseil de gérance de l’environnement des Laboratoires de Chalk River sur ses travaux de mise au jour de la calandre NRX, actuellement enfouie à faible profondeur dans la zone de gestion des déchets A (ZGD A).  Les notes de la réunion du Conseil numéro 53 du jeudi 21 mars 2024 indiquent qu’un membre du Conseil a demandé une mise à jour de ces travaux :

Que se passe-t-il d’autre avec le NRX Calandra [sic] dans la zone A de déchets ? 

Le Septième Rapport national du Canada pour la Convention commune fournit plus de détails sur la zone de gestion des déchets A :

C’est en 1946 qu’a commencé l’entreposage des déchets radioactifs sur le site des LCR, dans une zone maintenant appelée ZGD A. Cet entreposage a pris la forme d’un stockage définitif direct de solides et de liquides dans des tranchées de sable. Il s’agissait d’opérations modestes qui n’ont pas été consignées avant 1952, année où l’assainissement de l’accident du NRX a généré de grandes quantités de déchets radioactifs (incluant la calandre du réacteur) qui devaient être gérées rapidement, en toute sûreté. À cette occasion, environ 4 500 m³ de déchets aqueux contenant 330 TBq (9 000 Ci) de produits de fission mixtes ont été déversés dans les tranchées. Des dispersions plus modestes ont suivi (6,3 TBq et 34 TBq de produits de fission mixtes) en 1954 et 1955, respectivement. Aujourd’hui, la ZGD A n’accepte plus de déchets.

Le plan préliminaire global de déclassement de 2014 fait état de registres limités pour les liquides en fûts et en bouteilles enfouis avant 1956 et pour les déchets solides enfouis avant 1955.

Le Plan général de déclassement et de nettoyage des Laboratoires de Chalk River de 2023 indique l’intention de LNC de transférer tout le contenu de la ZGD A dans l’IGDPS : “le scénario préliminaire présenté est l’enlèvement des déchets de la ZGD A et leur élimination dans l’IGDPS.”   

Le manque de transparence de LNC concernant les déchets destinés au l’IGDPS, malgré les exigences du Règlement général sur la sûreté et la réglementation nucléaires (RGSRN), est l’un des principaux points de l’une des contestations juridiques de la décision de la CCSN d’autoriser la construction de l’installation.

L’exposé des faits et du droit dans l’affaire de la cour fédérale (dossier de la cour n° T-226-24) entre Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, le Regroupement pour la surveillance du nucléaire et le Ralliement contre la pollution radioactive (requérants) et les Laboratoires nucléaires canadiens (défendeurs) dit ceci : 

Le fait que la Commission n’ait pas exigé les informations spécifiques et complètes prévues par l’article 3(1)(c) et (j) du RGSRN a un impact énorme sur l’intégrité de la décision dans son ensemble. Ce manquement compromet la principale conclusion de la décision, à savoir que l’IGDPS n’aura pas d’effets négatifs importants sur l’environnement et la santé. Tous les calculs de LNC estimant la quantité de matières radioactives que l’IGDPS rejetterait dans l’environnement et à laquelle un membre du public serait exposé étaient basés sur le respect des critères d’acceptation des déchets.  Étant donné que des matériaux peuvent être placés dans l’IGDPS même s’ils ne répondent pas aux critères d’acceptation des déchets, tous les calculs et toutes les estimations sont fictifs. Il n’y a aucune garantie que la quantité et le type de substances qui aboutissent dans l’IGDPS seront les mêmes que ceux qui ont servi de base aux calculs des évaluations de sécurité.

~~~~~~~~~

Photos from Globe and Mail article (19 March 2023) “Jimmy Carter, Chalk River and the dawn of Canada’s nuclear age”

Chalk River NRX-Reactor leak, 1953 -- calandria removed from reactor being lowered into calandria bag. Photograph shows south-east sid
The NRX calandria is lowered into a protective bag and driven away to a disposal site in May 1953.CANADIAN NUCLEAR LABORATORIES

Now, 70 years after the cleanup, the largest artefact from the accident is about to see the light of day once again.

The burial mound of the NRX calandria, as seen earlier this month. Later this spring, a project team will resume work on excavating and then cutting up the calandria for longer term storage.CANADIAN NUCLEAR LABORATORIES/SUPPLIED

Will CNL put nuclear reactor components in the NSDF?

August 12, 2024 (en français ici)

Will CNL put nuclear reactor components in the NSDF?

The lack of clarity about the nature of the waste intended for disposal in the NSDF has been a concern since the NSDF project description was published in March 2016.  In our group’s comments on the project description, submitted in June 2016, we stated

For the public to have adequate information about the nature of the radioactive waste proposed for inclusion in the NSDF, the environmental assessment must provide much more detail than simply stating that the waste “will be required to meet waste acceptance criteria.”

CNL has prepared a document, NSDF Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) that CNL says “will ensure the short- and long-term protection of the public, the environment and workers.”  But is this true?  And do the NSDF Waste Acceptance Criteria allow CNL to place reactor components in the NSDF?

The calandria from the NRX reactor accident in December 1952 and two calandria from the NRU reactor are buried at shallow depths in the waste management areas of Chalk River Laboratories.  This is stated in the Overview Decommissioning and Cleanup Plan for Chalk River Laboratories: 

“Several special burials (NRU and NRX calandrias) were also made in concrete containers or directly in the trenches.”

The Waste Acceptance Criteria allow the disposal of waste classified as Type 6 – Oversized waste:

“Oversized debris, including waste that does not fall within the definition of waste types 1 to 5, primarily due to its size or shape. The process applicable to infrequently performed activities (section 6.4) is used to approve the placement of type 6 waste.”

The Infrequently Performed Operations override clause in section 6.4 states: 

“The eligibility of wastes that do not meet all the requirements set forth in the WAC (including Type 6, Oversized Waste) may be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”

Reactor calandrias would almost certainly exceed the “Dose Rate Limits and Means of Handling and Transferring ” in Table 7 of the WAC.  However, the Waste Acceptance Criteria allow these dose limits to be exceeded if waste packages are shielded: 

“Shielded Waste Packages could be used to ensure waste complies with the dose rate limit in Table 7.”

CNL has made a presentation to the Chalk River Laboratories Environmental Stewardship Council about its work to uncover the NRX calandria, currently buried at shallow depth in Waste Management Area A.  The notes from Council meeting number 53 on Thursday, March 21, 2024, state that a council member asked for an update on this work:

Has anything else been happening with the NRX Calandra [sic] with the Calandra [sic] in Waste Area A?

The Seventh Canadian National Report for the Joint Convention provides more details about Waste Management Area A:

The first emplacement of radioactive waste at the CRL site took place in 1946 into what is now referred to as Waste Management Area A. These emplacements took the form of direct disposal of solids and liquids into excavated sand trenches. The scale of operations was modest and unrecorded until 1952, when the cleanup from the NRX accident generated large quantities of radioactive waste (which included the reactor’s calandria) that had to be managed quickly and safely. At that time, approximately 4,500 m3 of aqueous waste, containing 330 TBq (9,000 Ci) of mixed fission products, was poured into excavated trenches. This action was followed by smaller dispersals (6.3 TBq and 34 TBq of mixed fission products) in 1954 and 1955, respectively. Waste is no longer accepted for emplacement in Waste Management Area A.

The 2014 Comprehensive Preliminary Decommissioning Plan notes the limited records for drummed and bottled liquids buried prior to 1956 and for solid wastes buried prior to 1955. 

The 2023 Overview Decommissioning and Cleanup Plan for Chalk River Laboratories indicates CNL’s intention to transfer all the contents of WMA A to the NSDF: “the preliminary scenario presented is the removal of wastes from WMA A and its disposal in the NSDF.”

CNL’s lack of transparency regarding the waste destined for the NSDF, despite the requirements of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations (GNSCR), is one of the main points of one of the legal challenges to the CNSC’s decision to authorize construction of the facility.  

The Memorandum of Fact and Law for the federal court case (Court File No. T-226-24) between Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility and le Ralliement contre la pollution radioactive (Applicants) and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (Respondent) says the following:

The Commission’s failure to require the specific and comprehensive information set out in GNSCR s. 3(1)(c) and (j) has an enormous impact on the integrity of the Decision as a whole. This failure undermines the Decision’s main conclusion that the NSDF will not produce significant adverse environmental and health effects. All CNL’s calculations estimating the amount of radioactive material that the NSDF would release into the environment and would expose a member of the public to were based on the Waste Acceptance Criteria being followed. Since materials can be placed in the NSDF even if they do not meet the Waste Acceptance Criteria, all the calculations and estimations are a fiction. There is no guarantee that the amount and type of substances that end up in the NSDF will be the same amount and type as that upon which the calculations for the safety assessments were made.

~~~~~~~~

Photos from Globe and Mail article (19 March 2023) “Jimmy Carter, Chalk River and the dawn of Canada’s nuclear age”

Chalk River NRX-Reactor leak, 1953 -- calandria removed from reactor being lowered into calandria bag. Photograph shows south-east sid
The NRX calandria is lowered into a protective bag and driven away to a disposal site in May 1953.CANADIAN NUCLEAR LABORATORIES

Now, 70 years after the cleanup, the largest artefact from the accident is about to see the light of day once again.

The burial mound of the NRX calandria, as seen earlier this month. Later this spring, a project team will resume work on excavating and then cutting up the calandria for longer term storage.CANADIAN NUCLEAR LABORATORIES/SUPPLIED

Lettre du Hill Times : Crise de la mauvaise gestion des déchets radioactifs dans le bassin versant de la rivière des Outaouais, Chef Lance Haymond et Dr. Gordon Edwards

le 20 mai, 2024

https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2024/05/20/crisis-of-radioactive-waste-management-in-the-ottawa-river-watershed-advocates/421802/

Nous écrivons pour alerter les lecteurs du Hill Times sur ce que nous considérons comme une crise de mauvaise gestion des déchets radioactifs dans le bassin versant de la rivière des Outaouais. Les éléments de cette crise sont les suivants:

·         Une gigantesque décharge en surface d’un million de tonnes de déchets radioactifs aux Laboratoires de Chalk River, à moins d’un kilomètre de la rivière des Outaouais. Selon l’inventaire autorisé pour l’installation, plus de la moitié des radionucléides ont une longue durée de vie, leurs demi-vies dépassant de plusieurs milliers d’années la durée de vie nominale de l’installation.  Les experts affirment que les déchets sont de “niveau intermédiaire” et qu’ils devraient être stockés sous terre. L’installation devrait laisser échapper des contaminants radioactifs pendant son fonctionnement et se décomposer en raison de l’érosion après quelques centaines d’années.

·         Une proposition visant à enterrer « in situ » un réacteur nucléaire défunt à moins de 400 mètres de la rivière des Outaouais, à Rolphton, en Ontario. La proposition bafoue les normes de sécurité internationales qui stipulent que l’enfouissement ne devrait être utilisé qu’en cas d’urgence.

·         Un consortium multinational du secteur privé transporte tous les déchets radioactifs fédéraux, y compris les déchets de combustible irradié de haute activité, vers Chalk River. Ces importations ont lieu malgré la demande explicite de la ville d’Ottawa, en 2021, de cesser les importations de déchets radioactifs dans la vallée de l’Outaouais, qui est sismiquement active et constitue un mauvais emplacement pour le stockage à long terme des déchets radioactifs.

·         Tout ce qui précède se produit malgré l’opposition du peuple algonquin, sur le territoire non cédé duquel se trouvent les laboratoires de Chalk River et le défunt réacteur de Rolphton. Cela contrevient à la Loi sur la Déclaration des Nations Unies sur les droits des peuples autochtones du Canada.

À notre avis, cette crise est le résultat direct du régime inadéquat de gouvernance nucléaire du Canada, dans lequel presque tous les aspects de la gouvernance nucléaire sont confiés à une seule agence, la Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire, qui est largement perçue comme étant capturée par l’industrie nucléaire et comme favorisant les projets qu’elle est censée réglementer. Parmi les autres problèmes, on peut citer les conflits d’intérêts, le manque de freins et contrepoids et une politique inadéquate en matière de déchets nucléaires.

Malgré les résolutions répétées de l’Assemblée des Premières Nations et de plus de 140 municipalités situées en aval, dont Ottawa, Gatineau et Montréal, le gouvernement actuel ne semble pas vouloir ou pouvoir prendre des mesures significatives pour résoudre cette crise. Nous faisons donc appel à l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique et demandons une réunion avec son équipe d’examen par les pairs qui doit se rendre au Canada le mois prochain.

Chef Lance Haymond, Première Nation Kebaowek

Gordon Edwards, Ph.D., Regroupement pour la surveillance du nucléaire

Hill Times letter: “Crisis of radioactive waste mismanagement in the Ottawa River watershed,” Chief Lance Haymond and Dr. Gordon Edwards

Monday May 20, 2024

https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2024/05/20/crisis-of-radioactive-waste-management-in-the-ottawa-river-watershed-advocates/421802/

We are writing to alert Hill Times readers to what we see as a crisis of radioactive waste mismanagement in the Ottawa River watershed. Components of the crisis include:

A giant, above-ground landfill for one million tonnes of radioactive waste at Chalk River Laboratories, less than one kilometre from the Ottawa River. According to the licensed inventory for the facility, more than half of the radionuclides are long-lived with half-lives exceeding the design life of the facility by thousands of years. Experts say the waste is “intermediate level,” and should be stored underground. There are concerns the facility will leak radioactive contaminants during operation, and break down due to erosion after a few hundred years.

There is a proposal to entomb “in situ” a defunct nuclear reactor less than 400 meters from the Ottawa River at Rolphton, Ont. In our view, the proposal flouts international safety standards that say entombment should not be used except in emergencies. 

A multinational private-sector consortium is transporting all federal radioactive wastes, including high-level irradiated fuel waste, to Chalk River. These imports are occurring, despite an explicit request by the City of Ottawa in 2021 for cessation of radioactive waste imports to the Ottawa Valley which is seismically-active, and a poor location for long-term storage of radioactive waste. 

All of the above is taking place despite the opposition of the Algonquin People on whose unceded territory the Chalk River Laboratories and defunct Rolphton reactor are located. This contravenes Canada’s United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act.

In our view, this crisis is a direct result of Canada’s inadequate nuclear governance regime under which almost all aspects of nuclear governance are entrusted to one agency, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, which is widely perceived to be captured by the nuclear industry, and to promote the projects it is supposed to regulate. Other concerns include conflicts of interest, lack of checks and balances, and an inadequate nuclear waste policy.

Despite repeated resolutions of concern by the Assembly of First Nations and more than 140 downstream municipalities—including Ottawa, Gatineau, and Montreal—the current government appears unwilling or unable to take meaningful action to address this crisis. We are therefore appealing to the International Atomic Energy Agency and requesting a meeting with its peer review team that is scheduled to visit Canada next month. 

Chief Lance Haymond, Kebaowek First Nation

Gordon Edwards, PhD, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

A rebuttal of the Government of Canada’s response to House of Commons e-Petition 4676

May 17, 2024. (version française ici)

House of Commons e-Petition 4676 requesting an IAEA ARTEMIS review of precedent-setting nuclear waste disposal projects in Canada received more than 3000 signatures between December 11, 2023 and January 10, 2024. Unfortunately, the Government of Canada’s response did not provide any clear reasons why it would not request an IAEA ARTEMIS review. Rather, the response reads like a promotional message from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, replete with platitudes, inaccuracies and unwarranted assurances.

For the record, Ralliement contre la pollution radioactive and Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area have prepared the following rebuttal to the response to share with Ministerial staff in hopes that they will reconsider the request for an ARTEMIS review in order to ensure that federal radioactive waste is properly managed for the good of current and future generations of Canadians.

House of Commons e-Petition 4676 including the Government’s response is here.

BLACK TEXT is the Government Response. 

RED TEXT is the Ralliement and CCRCA response to the Government’s response

“The Government of Canada is committed to the safe, effective, and environmentally sound management of radioactive waste. Advancing reconciliation and protecting the health and safety of Canadians and the environment is the government’s top priority when it comes to nuclear energy and radioactive waste.”  

If this is the case, why is the Government allowing a multinational consortium to promote radioactive waste projects like the Near Surface Disposal Facility (“NSDF”) project that fail to meet International Safety Standards?

  • CNL has not specified all substances to be disposed of in the NSDF. The Waste Acceptance Criteria, Reference Inventory Report, Safety Case, Safety Analysis Report, and Post-Closure Safety Assessment documents only provide partial lists. 
  • The Waste Acceptance Criteria document has a section entitled “Infrequently Performed Operations” that allows waste that does not meet the acceptance criteria to be placed in the NSDF. This effectively nullifies any guarantees about what may be placed in the NSDF.
  • After institutional control ends, the public would be exposed to radiation doses that exceed the limit of 10 µSv/y prescribed by Canadian regulations and international standards;
  • There was no assessment of the cumulative effects of all related nuclear projects, since CNL did not provide information about  many of them.
  • Disused, highly radioactive (9.06×10E+16 Bq) commercial cobalt-60 sources would be placed in the NSDF even though International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards specify that cobalt-60 sources can go into near surface disposal only if they are below a certain concentration of radioactivity. This restriction was ignored by CNL. The Waste Acceptance Criteria document was never revised accordingly despite public requests. 

“In addition, the Government of Canada recognizes the unique status and rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada and is committed to upholding these rights and implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the UN Declaration) in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous Peoples, with regard to radioactive waste management and decommissioning.”

Why then, is the Government of Canada allowing the NSDF to be licensed when 10 of 11 Algonquin First Nations, on whose unceded territory the facility would be built, say they do not consent.

“The development, production, and use of nuclear energy and materials are regulated by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canada’s independent nuclear regulator, which comprises the Commission and CNSC staff.” 

CNSC is not an independent nuclear regulator. It was noted by the Expert Panel on Environmental Assessment in 2017 that the CNSC is widely viewed to be a captured regulator that promotes the projects it is supposed to regulate.

“All nuclear projects, including the Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) proposed by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) and other proposed legacy radioactive waste projects, require the Commission’s authorization, under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), and they may also require an environmental assessment or an impact assessment.” 

The Environmental Assessment of the NSDF conducted by the CNSC took seven years to complete and was replete with flaws and errors. 

If it is not known what nuclear waste would be accepted in the NSDF, how is it possible to do an environmental assessment? Even during the final hearing for the NSDF license, the Waste Acceptance Criteria document was not finalized.  

The failure to address the inability of an above-ground mound to contain “long-lived radionuclides” for the duration of their hazard is a critical omission. The mound is designed to last only 550 years before eroding and releasing its contents to the environment.

“Pursuant to its mandate and responsibilities set out in the NSCA, the Commission is as an independent quasi-judicial tribunal that makes science and evidence-based decisions and solicits information from interested Canadians and Indigenous Peoples through public engagement and hearings.” 

Civil society groups identified many critical flaws, errors and omissions in the CNSC’s Environmental Assessment Report for the NSDF, and noted that it contained no references whatsoever, making it a very un-scientific document.

“Federal departments, such as Environment and Climate Change Canada, Health Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Natural Resources Canada, as well as other levels of government, participate in and contribute to environmental assessments, where applicable, for proposed major nuclear projects based on their expertise and knowledge. Along with public participation and input, including from Indigenous Peoples, this ensures an open, balanced process that strengthens the quality and credibility of a project’s review.” 

The CNSC ignored serious concerns about destruction of habitat for species at risk, noted by ECCC reviewers of the NSDF Environmental Impact Statement. Inputs from Indigenous Peoples and members of the public have been downplayed or ignored by the CNSC and its Commission throughout the environmental assessment and licensing processes.

“The Commission approves projects under the NSCA if it concludes that they will be safe for the public and the environment, both now and into the future, that Canadians have been engaged, and that Indigenous Peoples have been sufficiently and appropriately consulted.” 

The NSDF is expected to leak radioactive contaminants such as plutonium into the Ottawa River as documented in the Environmental Impact Statement. There is no safe level of exposure to these releases of radioactive substances into the environment. The CNSC allows such releases based on the premise that there is some benefit to society that justifies exposing people to these substances. So no, they do not conclude these projects are safe, only that the risks are “reasonable”.

If the Commission concluded that Indigenous Peoples had been sufficiently and appropriately consulted with respect to the NSDF, it was badly mistaken. The Algonquin People strongly disagree.

“The Minister of Energy and Natural Resources has no role in the Commission’s independent licensing decisions under the NSCA and did not participate in the environmental assessment decision of the NSDF project under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA, 2012).

The Commission ensures that all decisions it carries out under federal legislation uphold the honour of the Crown and that consultations with Indigenous Peoples and groups are undertaken whenever the Commission’s decisions or conduct may have a potential impact on Aboriginal or treaty rights protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. As Canada’s nuclear regulator, the CNSC is committed to long-term relationship building and to enabling meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples and groups in Commission proceedings and CNSC regulatory processes.”

Again, the Algonquin First Nations, on whose unceded ancestral homeland the NSDF would be built, say they do not consent and have not been adequately consulted.

“On June 21, 2021, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (UN Declaration Act) received Royal Assent and came into force. This Act requires the Government of Canada, in consultation and cooperation with Indigenous Peoples to: take all measures necessary to ensure that the laws (including regulations) of Canada are consistent with the Declaration (section 5); prepare and implement an action plan to achieve the Declaration’s objectives (section 6); and, table an annual report on progress to align the laws of Canada with the UN Declaration Act and on the action plan (section 7). The Action Plan was released in June 2023 and provides a roadmap of actions Canada needs to take in partnership with Indigenous peoples to implement the principles and rights set out in the UN Declaration and to further advance reconciliation in a tangible way.”  

Decisions on Nuclear waste projects in the Ottawa Valley are a perfect starting point for the Government of Canada to implement the principles set out in the UN Declaration. 

“Canada’s nuclear regulatory framework, including for radioactive waste management and decommissioning, is aligned with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards that are internationally well-regarded, as confirmed by peer reviews of international nuclear experts.”

“In 2019, an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Services (IRRS) Mission to Canada was requested by the Government of Canada. The purpose of the 2019 IRRS Mission was to perform a peer review of Canada’s regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety against IAEA Safety Standards, with a focus on radioactive waste management and decommissioning. The scope was more comprehensive than an IAEA Integrated Review Service for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management, Decommissioning and Remediation (ARTEMIS) review.” 

The IAEA offers various types of international peer reviews to member states. IRRS reviews are general and focus on the nuclear regulatory infrastructure. ARTEMIS reviews are specific to radioactive waste and include technical experts who assess the suitability of waste management proposals. ARTEMIS is the review that is relevant to the case of the three radioactive radioactive waste projects referred to in the petition. 

Many ways in which Canada’s nuclear regulatory framework does NOT align with IAEA standards are noted in the final report of the 2019 IRRS mission to Canada. Problems found by the international peer review team are summarized here: International peer review finds deficiencies in Canada’s nuclear safety framework. Nuclear industry veterans have noted that the precedent setting radioactive waste disposal projects referred to in Petition 4676 do not align with IAEA guidance and safety standards.

“The Mission concluded that Canada has a comprehensive and robust regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety covering current facilities and activities.”

The IRRS Mission found numerous deficiencies in Canada’s nuclear safety framework, as noted above and summarized hereFor example, the Mission noted that a systematic evaluation of justification for the various practices involving radiation sources in the licensing process was lacking in Canada’s framework, and recommended that a process be established for this. The Government of Canada’s response to the IRRS recommendations notes that this recommendation was “not accepted.” (module 1 IAEA suggestion 1)

“It also recommended that the Government should enhance the existing policy and establish the associated strategy to give effect to the principles stated in Canada’s former Radioactive Waste Policy Framework (1996). “

“A follow-up IRRS Mission will occur in June 2024, to review Canada’s progress on meeting the recommendations of the 2019 Mission. In 2022, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (CESD) found that Canada does a good job of managing low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste.”

“In 2023, the Government of Canada released a modernized Policy for Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning and accepted the Integrated Strategy for Radioactive Waste developed by the Nuclear Waste Management Organization and associated partners. Both reflect international best practices and enhance Canada’s framework so that radioactive waste management and disposal are carried out in a safe, environmentally sound, comprehensive, and integrated manner, now and for generations to come.”

The Government of Canada’s “modernization” process for its radioactive waste policy, prompted by the 2019 IRRS mission received a failing grade from the Canadian Environmental Law Association and many other NGOs in Canada.

The Government of Canada has been widely criticized for entrusting the development of radioactive waste strategy to a nuclear industry group, the NWMO. This is contrary to IAEA guidance and the way things are done in many other countries with more robust nuclear governance regimes that include independent waste management agencies. Waste from “Small Nuclear Reactors” was not addressed in the strategy.  Reactor decommissioning was not addressed. This is not acceptable.

“Canada’s commitment to nuclear safety is further reinforced through participation and leadership in the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the Joint Convention). The Joint Convention is the first legally binding international treaty governing all aspects of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.” 

Article 11 of the Joint Convention states that parties shall “ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum practicable.”This reflects the fact that radioactive waste is dangerous, poses risks to all living things and must be kept out of the biosphere for as long as it poses a radioactive hazard. Many people are unaware that Canada’s vaunted “CANDU” nuclear reactors produce five to ten times more radioactive waste per unit of electricity than other reactors. Also, Canada seemingly makes no effort to minimize the generation of radioactive waste.  Provincial and federal governments are currently seeking to expand nuclear electricity generation, even though conservation and renewable energy could meet the same needs without creating radioactive waste.

“Under the Joint Convention, delegates, including from Canada, participate in review meetings every three years to review the work of their peers to fulfill their obligations under the Convention.”  

Canada regularly receives tough questions from its peers at Joint Convention meetings. In the document Joint Convention 6th Review Meeting – Canada’s Responses to Questions raised from Peer Review 3 (2013-04-03), a Japanese contracting party outlined the following deficiencies. 

  • Question 31: In Canada, there is no difference of management practice for low level radioactive waste (LLW) and the management practice for intermediate level radioactive waste (ILW). 
  • Question 32: Is there a dose rate criteria to distinguish between HLW and ILW?

(In fact in Canada management of ILW has been neglected. There is no permanent disposal site  for ILW. The classification of HLW and ILW is very vague on purpose.  By a malicious change of the definition of these wastes, at Chalk River, the inventory of ILW has decreased dramatically while LLW has increased.) 

In the document Responses to Questions Raised from the Peer Review of Canada’s Seventh National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, experts from other countries have asked Canada:

  • United Kingdom, Radioactive waste inventory: In tables D.3 and D.5, the volumes of ILW and LLW at Chalk River Laboratories are provided but there is no indication of the activity associated with these wastes…
    1. Does Canada know the activity associated with this waste?
    2. If not, does Canada have any plans to determine it?
  • China:  In last report, it is mentioned that the near surface disposal facility (NSDF) would be built by 2020, but the date has been changed into 2024 in this report. What is the main reason for the delay?

“The Government is confident that the CNSC will continue to follow international standards and best practices in its licensing decisions and as needed, conduct international peer reviews as part of its commitment to continuous improvement in the management of radioactive waste and decommissioning.”

The Government’s confidence is misplaced. The CNSC flouts international standards repeatedly. For example, the 2019 IRRS mission called to attention the fact that entombing defunct reactors is permissible only in cases of emergency. Yet, after the visit and receipt of the recommendation,  the CNSC inserted language into its REGDOC-2.11.2, Decommissioning that enables in situ decommissioning (i.e., entombment) of future reactors where removal is not “possible and practicable.” This language contradicts IAEA safety standards and recommendations from the IRRS review team.

The IRRS mission called on CNSC to revise its Radiation Protection Regulations to reduce the allowable radiation dose to a pregnant nuclear energy worker from 4 mSv to 1 mSv, and to reduce radiation dose limits for apprentices or students aged 16 to 18.  No action has been taken.

CNSC also intervened behind the scenes to exempt “small modular reactors” from impact assessment, an act that would be unthinkable in most other countries. It is impossible to conceive of a technology more dangerous and in need of impact assessment than new experimental nuclear reactors.