An NSDF media kit on the website of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission states that
“Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) has been authorized to construct an engineered facility, called a near surface disposal facility (NSDF), to dispose of low-level radioactive waste at the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) site in Deep River, Ontario. Low-level radioactive waste includes contaminated building materials, soils, and operational equipment (for example, protective shoe covers, clothing, rags, mops, equipment and tools).” (emphasis added)
On page 88 of the transcript of the final licensing hearing for the NSDF on August 10, 2023, Meggan Vickerd, CNL deputy vice-president of Integrated Waste Services is quoted as saying this:
“It is important to restate that only low-level radioactive waste from Canadian sources will be accepted. This waste consists of building demolition debris from current decommissioning activities at the Chalk River Laboratories site, legacy wastes and associated impacted soils, as well as general waste items such as mops and rags generated from our ongoing operations.” (emphasis added)
In Paragraph 39 of its Record of Decision for the NSDF license approval, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission states: “The NSDF will contain only LLW.”
The statements above that the NSDF would only contain low-level waste do not stand up to scrutiny. The use of examples like “mops and rags and shoe covers” is misleading.
Consider that:
Much of the legacy waste at the Chalk River Labs site was created during plutonium production for the US nuclear weapons program and other activities involving “post-fission” radioactive waste ie. waste produced in a nuclear reactor. This post-fission waste includes very long-lived radioactive materials that are difficult to manage. Some of this waste can actually become more radioactive over time due to the complex decay chains of long-lived alpha emitters.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, waste from research facilities such as Chalk River Laboratories generally belongs to the “Intermediate-level” waste class and must be kept underground, tens of metres or more below the surface.
Twenty-five out of the 31 radionuclides listed in the reference inventory for the mound are long-lived with half-lives from thousands to millions of years.
A former senior manager at AECL told the CNSC that the waste would not decay to unconditional clearance levels for thousands of years. The design life of the facility is only 550 years. He also said that “the emplaced material is intermediate level radioactive waste that should not be emplaced in a near surface facility because it requires a greater degree of containment and isolation than that provided by near surface disposal.” (emphasis added) (more info)
It is becoming increasingly clear that long-lived radioactive materials that predominate in the NSDF licensed inventory, would outlive the facility by thousands of years.
Background
During the public comment period on the Environmental Impact Statement for the NSDF in 2017, many groups and individuals expressed concern about intermediate level waste being placed in an above ground mound.
The Town of Deep River and its then mayor Joan Lougheed were among those concerned about intermediate level waste being put into the NSDF. Mayor Lougheed was quoted in a 2017 Globe and Mail article, “Ontario town slams proposal for nuclear-waste facility,” as saying the town had concerns about the intermediate-level radioactive material that requires isolation and containment for more than several hundred years.
Shortly after the Globe and Mail article was published, CNL publicly announced that it would not put intermediate level waste in the mound. However CNL’s final Environmental Impact Statement says, “It is not practical, technical, or economical, to separate the long-lived radionuclides from the waste streams…”
According to the former director of Safety Engineering and Licensing at AECL and former Champion of the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities project, in his April 6, 2022 submission to the CNSC:
“The waste acceptance criteria are insufficiently protective for the material permitted to be emplaced in the proposed Engineered Containment Mound to qualify as low level waste — the radionuclides do not decay to an acceptable level during the time that institutional controls can be relied upon. Consequently, the emplaced material is intermediate level radioactive waste that should not be emplaced in a near surface facility because it requires a greater degree of containment and isolation than that provided by near surface disposal.” (emphasis added)
and
CNL’s proposal is not a disposal facility for low level radioactive waste: Proposal is an Engineered Containment Mound comprising a large and unverified quantity of intermediate-level waste; (Slide 12)
“A decision to approve the construction of a nuclear waste storage facility two hours west of Ottawa has led Indigenous leaders, activists and experts to voice concerns about what they describe as fundamental aws within Canada’s nuclear regulator.”
“Critics of the decision believe the recent approval is the latest example of the CNSC prioritizing the nuclear industry over Canadians, which they say stems from a lack of regulatory independence.”
“Bloc Québécois MP Monique Pauzé lamented the approval what she described in French as an “insane and inconceivable project.”
“Ottawa confirms to us the bogus status of the hearings conducted by the CNSC where the Commission heard the opposition of multiple stakeholders only to nally brush them aside in the decision rendered yesterday,” Pauzé said in a statement.”
Ottawa River radioactive waste dump ~ license approved by the CNSC
January 13, 2024
Dear Friends
Yesterday afternoon Canada’s captured nuclear regulator, the CNSC, announced its approval of the license to build the giant above-ground radioactive waste mound beside the Ottawa River, aka the NSDF. See below a few links to good coverage of reactions to the announcement.
There was never any doubt that the CNSC would approve the license. The surprise is how long it took them to do so — seven and a half years! That is a testament to the incredible opposition that mobilized to fight the ill-conceived plan. In a David and Goliath battle, opponents effectively derailed the original plan of the CNSC and the consortium to have shovels in the ground six years ago, in January 2018. That is an accomplishment worth celebrating!
The battle is not over. It will move to the courts now. And along with our allies, we will continue to push for an international ARTEMIS review of the proposal. On that note, thank you to everyone who signed and shared House of Commons e-Petition 4676; the petition just closed for signatures today having been signed by well over 3000 Canadians in just 30 days. A meeting with MP Sophie Chatel about how to move the request for an ARTEMIS review forward will take place soon. Other next steps are in the works and we will keep you posted about them as the plans crystalize.
We are very grateful to our Algonquin brothers and sisters for their strong stand against irresponsible nuclear waste projects in their unceded territory. We look forward to continuing to work with them toward an ultimate victory at some point down the road.
This seems a good time to share the inspiring words of Algonquin Elder Claudette Commanda, delivered during a press conference at 50 Sussex Drive on August 10, 2023. The press conference can be viewed at this link and Claudette’s statement begins at 13 minutes. Here is some of what she said that day, to rousing applause:
“This nuclear waste facility will damage the water and we all know that.
Conscientious people are rising. We must rise together, we are all in that medicine wheel. No matter our colour, our creed or our title, we are all related in the human family and we must stand together
We have a responsibility to our brothers the animals, to our sisters the animals. To the water life and to the land.
We cannot stop the thunder.
We cannot stop the rain from falling.
We cannot stop the lightning from shining
We cannot stop the rivers from flowing
But together as human beings, as brothers and sisters, we can certainly stop the nuclear waste facility from coming here on the Ottawa River.Meegwetch”
Thank you everyone for your ongoing interest and support. Please feel free to forward this message to anyone you think might be interested. Good overviews for people new to the issue are here and here.
NUCLEAR WASTE AT CHALK RIVER: KEBAOWEK FIRST NATION CONDEMNS CNSC DECISION AND CALLS ON THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT
KEBAOWEK, January 9, 2024 – Despite concerns expressed by First Nations and increased support from over 140 municipalities across Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has granted the license for the Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF) project at Chalk River. In response, the Kebaowek First Nation strongly condemns this decision and calls on the federal government to intervene to stop this environmentally high-risk project.
“The Commission’s decision is unacceptable, notably because it goes against the rights of Indigenous peoples and environmental protection. The Canadian government must act promptly and immediately assert the suspension of the project. The Commission’s final decision is totally wrong when it states that the NSDF project will not cause significant environmental effects. While the decision states that CNL will take appropriate measures to safeguard the environment, the health, safety of individuals, and national security and to comply with national obligations, it is undeniable that the safety and health of people and the environment will be profoundly impacted for generations to come through this project, ” reacted Chief Lance Haymond of Kebaowek.
It is worth noting that the NSDF would release radioactive and hazardous materials into a nearby wetland and the Ottawa River during its operation and after its closure. The mound is expected to degrade through a process of “normal evolution”. The NSDF could also contaminate the river following earthquakes, wildfires, floods, and other extreme weather events. Not only is the Kichi Sibi sacred to the Algonquin Peoples, but the Chalk River site is also close to the sacred Algonquin sites of Oiseau Rock and Baptism Point.
In 2017, the Assembly of First Nations adopted a resolution stating that the CNSC and the Canadian government had not fulfilled their constitutional obligation to consult and accommodate First Nations regarding the NSDF. The Anishinabek Nation and the Iroquois caucus issued a joint statement on radioactive waste, asserting that “we must protect the land, water, and all living beings for future generations” and calling for no abandonment of radioactive waste, moving it away from major waterways, and eliminating the practice of importing or exporting radioactive waste.
In addition to the opposition of Algonquin First Nations to the project, over 140 municipalities in Quebec and Ontario, including Gatineau and Montreal, as well as several civil society organizations, have expressed their opposition to the NSDF plan. In 2021, the City of Ottawa adopted a resolution expressing its concern.
The Kebaowek First Nation, committed to defending the rights of Indigenous peoples and environmental preservation, expresses its eagerness to collaborate with the government and other stakeholders to ensure a careful consideration of Indigenous concerns and compliance with the obligations of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in the context of this project. The First Nation maintains its categorical opposition to the establishment of a permanent NSDF on unceded Anishinabe territory, emphasizing the crucial importance of protecting Indigenous rights, the environment, and cultural heritage. Faced with a lack of trust in the CNSC and its persistent failure to uphold UNDRIP, the First Nation calls on the federal government, including the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, to intervene and end the project.
“I want to be very clear: the Algonquin Peoples did not consent to the construction of this radioactive waste dump on our unceded territory. We believe the consultation was inadequate, to say the least, and that our Indigenous rights are threatened by this proposal. We demand the cancellation of the NSDF project. The focus should instead be on a real and successful cleanup of the site to permanently eliminate old radioactive waste,” explains Chief Haymond.
Kebaowek First Nation Chief Lance Haymond speaking at a press conference in Ottawa in June 2023
On August 10, 2023, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission held a precedent-setting final licensing hearing for a giant above-ground radioactive waste dump beside the Ottawa River upstream of Ottawa-Gatineau and Montreal at Chalk River, Ontario.
Delegations from three Algonquin First Nations – Kebaowek, Kitigan Zibi and Barriere Lake – gathered at 50 Sussex Drive to make their final presentations in-person to community members, non-Indigenous allies and a handful of elected officials, in defiance of a Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) decree that the hearing would be virtual only. The CNSC presided over the hearing by Zoom.
While the hearing was taking place, an unprecedented storm hit the venue with huge amounts of rain, thunder, hail and wind that blew over the chairs on the outdoor covered terrace where the overflow crowd was watching the proceedings. Despite the ferocious storm, Algonquin Elders kept a ceremonial sacred fire burning throughout.
If approved, the giant dump, called a “near-surface disposal facility” (NSDF) by the proponent, would hold one million tonnes of radioactive and hazardous waste in an above-ground mound on the property of Chalk River Laboratories, a heavily contaminated federal nuclear facility established on stolen Algonquin land in 1944 to produce plutonium for US nuclear weapons. Chalk River Laboratories is a huge environmental liability for the Government of Canada, with an estimated cleanup cost in the billions of dollars.
The dump proponent is a multinational consortium comprised of SNC-Lavalin, and two Texas-based multinationals, Fluor and Jacobs. The consortium was contracted by the Harper government in 2015 to quickly and cheaply reduce the enormous federal legacy nuclear waste liability. Perversely, costs to Canadian taxpayers for managing Canada’s federal legacy radioactive wastes ballooned to more than 1 billion dollars per year after privatization.
The August 10 hearing was precedent-setting in two ways. If approved, the NSDF would be the first ever facility for permanent disposal of nuclear reactor waste in Canada. Secondly, the decision whether or not to license the facility is an important test of Canada’s commitment to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which forbids storage of radioactive waste on the land of Indigenous Peoples without their free, prior and informed consent. Ten of the eleven Algonquin First Nations whose people have lived in the Ottawa Valley since time immemorial say they do not consent to the NSDF on their unceded territory.
Many of the wastes proposed for disposal in the NSDF will be hazardous and radioactive for thousands to millions of years, according to Canada’s foremost expert on the federal legacy radioactive wastes and how best to manage them, Dr. JR Walker. Dr. Walker has clearly stated that wastes proposed for the NSDF do not qualify as low level waste but are in fact“intermediate level” radioactive waste that should be disposed of tens to hundreds of meters below the ground surface. He also notes that the proposal is non-compliant with International Safety Standards.
The site for the proposed “NSDF” is on the side of a hill surrounded by wetlands that drain into the Ottawa River – less than one kilometre away. The proponent’s environmental impact statement documents many ways the dump could leak during operation and after closure. Three isotopes of plutonium are included in the long list of radionuclides that would be discharged into the Ottawa River in “treated effluent” from the dump. The mound is expected to degrade and erode and eventually disintegrate due to “natural evolution.”
Most people believe it is wrong to deliberately discharge radioactive materials into a major drinking water source such as the Ottawa River, since there is no safe level of exposure to these man-made poisons. Every accidental and deliberate discharge increases risks of cancer, birth defects and genetic damage in the populations exposed.
The Assembly of First Nations and more than 140 downstream municipalities – including Ottawa, Gatineau and Montreal – have passed resolutions of concern about the NSDF proposal.
Despite the many serious shortcomings and strong opposition, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission staff have never wavered in their support for the dump. It appears they never “got the memo” back in 2000, when the organization’s mandate changed under new legislation from a role that included promotion of the nuclear industry, to a mandate strictly focused on protecting Canadians and the environment.
The August 10 hearing was presided over by only one Commissioner – along with the CNSC President. Both of their CVs tout long service and allegiance to the nuclear industry. The two officials askednot one single question of the First Nation intervenor teams, who were clearly shocked by the lack of interest in the information they had gone to such great lengths to gather and share. A member of the team asked, “Well, can we ask you some questions?” to which the President curtly replied, “That’s not our process.”
Canada’s seriously deficient nuclear governance regime has been described previously in the Hill Times here and here. Nuclear governance in Canada relies heavily on the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission for almost all aspects of nuclear industry oversight. The CNSC is widely perceived to be a “captured regulator” that promotes the projects it is supposed to regulate.
It is clear that our seriously deficient nuclear governance regime has enabled the NSDF — a grotesque mockery of a responsible radioactive waste management facility— to be proposed and taken seriously in Canada. A CNSC decision to approve the license for the NSDF is expected soon.
The powerful storm that pounded 50 Sussex Drive while testimony was being heard in the Algonquin language about greed and heedless destruction of the environment, underlined the serious decision being contemplated. There is no question that a record-breaking storm like that one, hitting the NSDF during its 50-year long filling stage – while wastes are exposed to the elements, could readily cause large spills of radioactive poisons and other hazardous materials into the Ottawa River.
It’s long past time that the government woke up and dealt with this environmental catastrophe in the making, a serious problem that will only grow steadily worse the longer it is ignored.
Lynn Jones is a retired public health program manager now with Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area, a non-governmental organization that has been working for the clean-up and prevention of radioactive pollution from the nuclear industry in the Ottawa Valley for over 40 years. She is based in Ottawa.
Image below is a simulation of the bathtub effect from the Decouverte documentary “Chalk River Heritage.”
The seven year long, CNSC-led, Environmental Assessment of the proposed giant radioactive waste mound or “NSDF” has been fraught with serious problems and deficiencies. These deficiencies, in our view, have led to a poor-quality assessment, leaving the Commission with poor recommendations on which to base its EA decision.
Inadequate consultation with Indigenous Peoples on whose unceded territory the proposed radioactive dump would be built
CNSC and the proponent announced the design, site and commencement of an EA for the dump in 2016. No consultation with Algonquin First Nations occurred prior to the announcement of the design, site and EA. Some consultations occurred during the protracted EA, but not all Algonquin First Nations were consulted. As a seeming afterthought, after the final NSDF licensing hearing concluded in June 2022, the CNSC decided to leave the record open for further consultations with two of the eleven Algonquin First Nations whose peoples have lived in the Ottawa River watershed since time immemorial, and whose people never ceded their territory to the Crown via a treaty.
Problems in the early stages with the project description and scoping for the EA
1 The CNSC dismissed critical comments on the project description, submitted by radioactive waste management experts, that should have resulted in a fundamental rethinking of the project design, or at least major changes to the scope of the Environmental Assessment.
2The CNSC’s scoping of the Near Surface Disposal Project (NSDF) was seriously flawed. A combined scoping decision for three separate projects (the NSDF, and the entombment of the NPD and WR-1 reactors) was made nine days before the draft environmental impact statement (EIS) for the NSDF project was released. The CNSC allowed the proponent to conduct environmental impact studies before the project scope was determined. The scoping decision ignored many serious criticisms of the NSDF project description. It was released by a 1-person “Panel” comprised solely of the CNSC President. The public was not apprised of the “Panel” hearing, which may never have actually taken place.
Obstacles to “meaningful public participation”
3 The CNSC did not require the NSDF proponent to translate documents into French, despite a clear potential for adverse environmental impacts in the Province of Quebec. The closest residents to the NSDF project site are in Quebec. Lack of access to French language documents led to a complaint from a Quebec citizen and a decision by the Commissioner of Official Languages to require translation of the draft EIS.
4 The CNSC delayed or refused to provide access to documents referenced in the draft EIS for the Near Surface Disposal Project. A footnote on page 3-14 of the draft EIS (12) states that “The Safety Analysis Report demonstrates that even after failure of some of the design features, the wastes do not present a risk to the public and environment.” However, the Safety Analysis Report was not released until after the public comment period on the draft EIS ended. Key portions of this document (such as section 4.2.1.3 on “Nuclear Criticality Safety”) were redacted.
5The CNSC did not provide the “meaningful opportunities for public participation” required by section 4(1)(e) of CEAA 2012. CNSC closed the record for public comments pursuant to the Environmental Assessment in August 2017 following CNL’s release of a draft Environmental Impact Statement. This created nearly a 5-year gap before the May/June 2022 hearing. CNSC provided no opportunity for the public to provide formally recorded comments on the final EIS, despite the numerous changes made to the project that are reflected in it.
6 The CNSC arbitrarily decided that written intervenors at the May/June 2022 hearing would not have the right to make final submissions.
7 The CNSC’s January 31, 2023 Notice of Public Hearing and Procedural Guidance for Final Submissions said that “new information may not be presented.” This was changed very close to the submission deadline (on May 17, 2023) to “Final submissions may reference any material on the record.”
8 The CNSC public hearings provided no opportunity for witnesses to be cross-examined.
9 During public hearings, the proponent (CNL), its contractor (AECL) and the regulator (CNSC) were given unlimited time to make their arguments, but intervenors (other than First Nations) were restricted to 10 minute presentations. In some cases this required thousands of hours of research to be summarized in 10 minutes.
10 The document registry for the NSDF EA was very cumbersome and awkward and did not facilitate access to submissions by all interested parties.
CNSC staff recommendations to Commissioners fail to mention that the Commission is required to refer the decision to Cabinet if the project is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects
12 There is no mention of CEAA 2012 Section 52 in CMD 22-H7. In this document CNSC staff recommend that the Commission decide that the NSDF is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects. However, Section 52 says the Commission could decide that the NSDF is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects; in which case the Commission must refer the matter to the Governor in Council (Cabinet). Were CNSC staff so certain that the Commission would never dare to disagree with one of their recommendations that they felt it was not worth mentioning this option? Regardless, this is a serious omission. Information provided in CMD 22-H7 about “matters of regulatory interest” with respect to the proposed NSDF should be complete and objective.
CNSC staff allowed the proponent to write its own conditions (856 “mitigation measures”) and the manner in which they are written makes them impossible to enforce.
13. Section 53 of CEAA 2012 says that it is the decision maker — either the Commission or Cabinet and not the proponent – that “must establish the conditions… that would permit a designated project to be carried out.” However, CNSC staff allowed the proponent to write its own conditions (the 856 mitigation measures in CNL’s 105-page NSDF Consolidated Commitments List) in a manner that they would be impossible to enforce. There is no evidence that the Commission ever reviewed these conditions. Furthermore, the CNSC staff draft licence handbook for the NSDF Project requires CNL to only implement mitigation measures during construction and pre-operation activities. Most of the significant adverse impacts of the NSDF Project would occur in the operation and post-closure phases. By only requiring mitigation of adverse effects occurring during construction and pre-operation activities, the CNSC’s approach would not mitigate the most significant adverse impacts of the NSDF Project.
“With regard to section 53, it is astounding that the CNSC has allowed the proponent, CNL, to write its own mitigation measures, and to write them in such a way that nearly all of them would be unverifiable.”
Ole Hendrickson, CCRCA researcher
Problems with the “Administrative Protocol” document
The “Administrative Protocol” is a document co-signed by the regulator and the proponent. It described the steps to be followed for the Environmental Assessment with milestones and target dates.
Six different versions of Appendix A to the Protocol were published between 2016 and 2022.
The Administrative Protocol omitted any mention of the Duty to Consult with First Nations
At one point in the middle of the EA process all the dates for milestones were removed. Interested parties were left with no idea when they might be required to allocate time to preparing final briefs and oral presentations.
An original provision for a dedicated Environmental Assessment hearing was removed. No Environmental Assessment hearing was ever held. The Environmental Assessment report was buried in a staff document and contained no references whatsoever.
And finally…
The CNSC, as responsible authority, was unable to complete the Environmental Assessment in a “timely manner” as required by section 4(1)(f) of CEAA 2012.
EAs normally are completed within one or two years. The EA of the NSDF is currently in its seventh year and counting.
Should the CNSC be responsible for environmental assessment?
The Expert Panel on Reform of Environmental Assessment recommended in its final report to the Minister of Environment and Climate Change in 2017 that the CNSC not be in charge of Environmental or Impact Assessments. The CNSC-led EA of the NSDF proposal was started before the Expert Panel review so it was conducted under previous legislation, but the flaws and failings documented above seem to suggest that removing the CNSC from involvement in Impact Assessment would be prudent.
Photo below by Robert Del Tredici, August 2018, Ottawa
Natural Resources Canada recently announced the release of a new federal radioactive waste policy. It was three years in the making and was only undertaken because of pressure from civil society groups and criticism from an international peer review team who visited Canada in September 2019 under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In our view, the new radioactive waste policy is a failure on several counts. For example:
It fails to include a requirement to keep radioactive waste out of the biosphere;
It fails to incorporate input from thousands of Canadians who participated in good faith in the review process. For example, the policy does not include a prohibition on plutonium extraction and it also fails to address calls from citizens and NGOs from across Canada for an independent authority to oversee nuclear waste management and decommissioning;
It fails to address serious problems identified by the IAEA in 2019; eg. the IAEA explicitly said defunct nuclear reactors should not be entombed in place except in extreme circumstances, yet the new policy allows for this and enables projects to abandon reactors beside the Ottawa and Winnipeg Rivers to move forward;
It fails to require that “free prior and informed consent” be obtained before radioactive waste is stored or disposed of on lands or territories of Indigenous Peoples as laid out in Article 29(2) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In 2021, Canada affirmed the UNDeclaration as a universal international human rights instrument with application in Canadian law. However a proposed giant radioactive waste mound alongside the Ottawa River in unceded Algonquin traditional territory is close to approval and would violate this principle. The new policy will do nothing to stop this. The final licensing hearing is scheduled for June 27.
Canada’s new radioactive waste policy appears to provide the nuclear industry with exactly what it wanted – license to abandon radioactive waste quickly and cheaply – and to afford Canadians with little protection from radioactive wastes that will remain hazardous for thousands of years.
Our letter of March 2021 to the Hill Times noted that Canada’s nuclear governance regime is inadequate, consisting of one captured, pro-industry regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and one pro-nuclear government department, Natural Resources Canada. Other OECD countries have much more robust nuclear governance regimes that include checks and balances, and multiple, multidisciplinary oversight committees and councils, often including high ranking officials such as the President in the case of France. A detailed review of shortcomings in Canada’s nuclear governance was provided to the Auditor General in 2019 in the form of Petition 427 from our respective citizens’ groups, Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area and Concerned Citizens of Manitoba and colleagues in Quebec.
We should not be surprised that Canada’s new radioactive waste policy is a failure, as it is the product of a sorely deficient nuclear governance regime.
In 2021 we asked who would fix Canada’s nuclear governance gaps. Now we must also ask “Who will correct the serious deficiencies in Canada’s new radioactive waste policy?” If these problems are not corrected, the nuclear industry in Canada will proceed to implement bargain basement nuclear waste projects that are out of step with international safety standards. This will lead to permanent radioactive contamination of major Canadian water bodies including the Ottawa and Winnipeg Rivers.
Lynn Jones, MHSc Ottawa, Ont., Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area
A key takeaway from this briefer is that because they use unenriched uranium as fuel, Canadian nuclear reactors produce roughly ten times more radioactive waste per unit electricity generated, than US nuclear reactors.
Background: In 2017, civil society groups were trying to understand how three irresponsible radioactive waste projects (the giant Chalk River mound and two legacy reactor entombments), could be undergoing environmental assessment in Canada. The lack of a substantive federal radioactive waste policy was noted as a serious problem that had allowed the projects to proceed. The policy vacuum was brought to the attention of the IAEA, the Prime Minister, the Auditor General and many other Canadian officials. In September 2019, an international peer review team from IAEA flagged Canada’s lack of a radioactive waste policy as a serious problem. In response, Natural Resources Canada began a review process which took place from 2020 to 2023. The review included extensive involvement from civil society groups and concerned individuals across Canada. The new policy, released in March 2023, is a huge disappointment to many people who, in good faith, worked hard to provide many valuable suggestions only to find their input virtually ignored by the captured bodies (CNSC and NRCan) that developed the policy. In the words of our Quebec colleagues at Ralliement contre la pollution radioactive, the policy is “a fiasco and a slap in the face to democracy.” What follows is a detailed analysis of the many serious failings of Canada’s new “modernized” radioactive waste policy.
***
Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) uses “ensure” in its various forms 28 times in the final version of its new radioactive waste policy, up from 14 times in the draft.
Use of “ensure” in a policy context represents an empty promise – a promise that is not associated with any specific action and that lacks a verifiable, measurable, time-bound target. Reliance on such language indicates an intent to avoid further discussion.
For example, NRCan’s claim that Canada could “ensure nuclear non-proliferation” if plutonium reprocessing were to be allowed (and plutonium-fueled reactors were to be exported to other countries) demonstrates the policy’s superficial and specious nature.
The closest thing to a target in the policy is found in one of the “vision” statements:
By 2050, key elements of Canada’s radioactive waste disposal infrastructure are in place, and planning is well under way for the remaining facilities necessary to accommodate all of Canada’s current and future radioactive wastes.
This begs the questions, “What are those “key elements?” and “What are the remaining facilities?” To achieve this rather weak and vague vision:
The federal government accordingly ensures… that responsibility for maintaining institutional controls over the long term, including the preservation of records and knowledge management of radioactive wastes, is assigned, in an open and transparent manner, to an appropriate entity.
It appears that the federal government is unprepared to accept responsibility at this time for managing radioactive waste, even the waste that it has generated. The federal government created the nuclear industry and generated a massive (~ $16 billion) waste liability through R&D work carried out by the crown corporation Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) over the past 75 years. AECL continues to receive annual appropriations exceeding a billion dollars.
The policy only promises that at some indefinite time in the future the government will “ensure” that an “appropriate entity” is created to maintain institutional controls over the long term. This side-steps the key issue of governance. A public entity to oversee radioactive waste management is urgently needed. Hundreds of submissions on the draft policy called for the government to establish an independent oversight body now.
Although the policy gives the nuclear industry free rein in managing its waste, with no oversight, it assigns no real responsibility to the industry, either. It calls upon the industry to develop “conceptual approaches” and to submit an “Integrated Strategy for Canada’s radioactive waste to the federal government for review and consideration.”
An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report prompted the government to undertake a radioactive waste policy review. The IAEA specifically recommended that the government “enhance” the principles contained in its previous Radioactive Waste Policy Framework. The most important principle was “polluter pays”:
The waste producers and owners are responsible, in accordance with the principle of “polluter pays”, for the funding, organization, management and operation of disposal and other facilities required for their wastes.
Rather than being enhanced, this principle was deleted from the new policy. This opens the door to subsidies from the federal government for management of radioactive wastes produced by non-federal entities.
The policy lacks acceptable language regarding assessment of radioactive waste management facilities. NRCan rejected the following civil society proposal:
Amend the Physical Activities Regulations under the Impact Assessment Act to include construction and operation of new nuclear reactors, decommissioning of nuclear reactors, and all phases in the development, operation and closure of long-term waste management facilities.
Instead, NRCan said:
The Policy recognizes and is aligned with federal legislation, particularly the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, the Impact Assessment Act and the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act, as well as other legislation, associated regulations, and other policy tools that further support radioactive waste management,
adding that
These policy tools are regularly reviewed and updated by the federal government, as required, to ensure they remain relevant and effective.
This is a dubious claim, given that the government had not reviewed or updated the previous waste policy “framework” for 27 years, and has not reviewed or updated the Nuclear Safety and Control Act for 26 years.
Stating that the new policy “is aligned with” the Impact Assessment Act fails to mention that the Physical Activities Regulations under this Act exempt decommissioning of reactors and other nuclear facilities, new radioactive waste storage facilities, fuel waste reprocessing facilities with an annual production capacity of less than 100 tonnes of plutonium per year, and construction and operation of small modular reactors (and management of their wastes).
Hence, nearly all major nuclear activities are exempted from assessment.
Most current nuclear decommissioning activities are occurring on federal lands owned by AECL. In theory, impact assessment is required for all projects occurring on federal lands under section 82 of the Impact Assessment Act.
AECL, despite being a federal authority under the Act, ignores decommissioning projects, and delegates the determination of the significance of other waste-related activities (such as a new intermediate-level waste storage facility) to its private contractor, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories. This is not allowed under the Act.
With regard to health, safety and environmental aspects of radioactive waste management, NRCan rejected the following civil society suggestions on the policy draft:
Radioactive waste will be contained and monitored to ensure it remains isolated from the accessible biosphere for the time frame relevant to the category of waste;” and “Prioritize the health, safety and security of people and the environment by requiring that radioactive wastes are kept contained and isolated from the biosphere.”
These suggestions were based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standard for radioactive waste disposal. The IAEA says:
The specific aims of disposal are:
(a) To contain the waste;
(b) To isolate the waste from the accessible biosphere and to reduce substantially the likelihood of, and all possible consequences of, inadvertent human intrusion into the waste;
(c) To inhibit, reduce and delay the migration of radionuclides at any time from the waste to the accessible biosphere;
(d) To ensure that the amounts of radionuclides reaching the accessible biosphere due to any migration from the disposal facility are such that possible radiological consequences are acceptably low at all times.
The new policy does not contain the words “biosphere”, “isolation”, “migration” or “intrusion”, instead substituting vague phrases such as “ensure protection of the environment”. The policy’s failure to commit to isolating waste from the biosphere allows the nuclear industry to use the environment – particularly water bodies – as a way of diluting and disposing of its radioactive waste.
The policy’s failure to commit to isolating waste from the biosphere allows the nuclear industry to use the environment – particularly water bodies – as a way of diluting and disposing of its radioactive waste.
Dilution is the strategy employed by the “NSDF project”, announced by a consortium of multinational companies immediately after the Harper government contracted them to deal with the 75-year accumulation of radioactive waste at AECL’s nuclear sites across Canada. The NSDF would be Canada’s first permanent disposal facility for radioactive waste from nuclear reactors – a million-cubic-meter mound of waste next to the Ottawa River, including a pipeline that would discharge partially-treated leachate from the mound into a lake that drains into the river. It would set a terrible precedent for future facilities.
First Nations have expressed serious concerns about the NSDF project and two other permanent disposal projects that involve entombing AECL prototype reactors in concrete and grout and abandoning them next to the Ottawa and Winnipeg Rivers.
After the public comment period on the draft policy, a new section was added entitled “Canada’s commitment towards building partnerships and advancing reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.” It calls for “early, continuous and meaningful engagement” in future radioactive waste projects. However, the policy is silent on the question of whether the current disposal projects – announced without that early engagement – could be approved without the free, prior and informed consent of First Nations. Nor does the new policy commit to First Nations “consent” for future projects.
Another new section, entitled “Scope of the Policy,” adds confusion about reprocessing and fails to address Canada’s experimental work with plutonium fuels. The language on reprocessing says:
Reprocessing, the purpose of which would be to extract fissile material from nuclear fuel waste for further use, is not presently employed in Canada, and so is outside the scope of this Policy.
However, the federally-owned Recycle Fuel Fabrication Laboratories have been conducting plutonium fuel research for many years. Furthermore the government has given a private company $50.5 million to develop a commercial reprocessing facility under the guise of waste “recycling”.
Despite thousands of letters requesting a ban on plutonium reprocessing in the policy and noting the dangers of this technology for nuclear weapons proliferation, the word “plutonium” appears nowhere. Claiming that reprocessing is “outside the scope” of a radioactive waste policy is irresponsible. Furthermore, a new phrase in section 1.7 of the final policy encourages “recycling and reuse of materials.” This could be read as promoting “recycling” of used fuel to extract plutonium.
Also highly problematic is the following phrase in the new policy:
The government of Canada remains deeply committed to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remains the only legally binding global treaty promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. State Parties to this treaty “undertake never under any circumstances to… Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
While Canada may refuse to acknowledge the existence of the TPNW, this does not alter the fact that the international community has acted to ban nuclear weapons.
The section on “Scope of the Policy” also contains contradictory and confusing wording on naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). The IAEA says NORM is “Radioactive material containing no significant amounts of radionuclides other than naturally occurring radionuclides.” The IAEA definition explicitly includes “Material in which the activity concentrations of the naturally occurring radionuclides have been changed by a process.”
In contrast, the new policy defines NORM as “material found in the environment that contains radioactive elements of natural origin.” This would appear to exclude from the policy the waste that is created when NORM is extracted from the environment and then processed.
The CNSC regulates many facilities that process NORM (using the internationally agreed definition): uranium mines, Cameco’s processing facilities in Blind River and Port Hope, fuel fabrication facilities, etc. The new policy also says:
“this Policy does not address NORM other than those associated with the development, production or use of nuclear energy or technologies and those associated with the transport and import/export of nuclear substances.”
This statement is both grammatically incorrect (NORM refers to “material”, not “materials”) and does not adequately address the contradiction inherent in defining NORM in a manner that excludes the many processing activities occurring in Canada, and the wastes they generate.
The terms “process” and “processing” appear nowhere in the policy. Even the word “uranium” is absent from the policy, further illustrating the superficial nature of the new policy.
Also problematic is the reference to “an independent nuclear regulator that makes decisions using inclusive, open, and transparent public hearings.” Self-serving promotion of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission does not belong in a radioactive waste policy. Claims of transparency and openness do not match reality. The real issue is that the CNSC invariably dismisses public input in making its decisions.
Public input has also been dismissed in this new policy. It reads as if it was written by the CNSC, which may be true. The CNSC is widely considered to be completely “captured” by the nuclear industry, with a revolving door between CNSC, the nuclear industry, and Natural Resources Canada.
The policy rejects the demand by civil society organizations for a ban on imports of radioactive waste from other countries. It says that the federal government:
is committed to the principle that radioactive waste generated in other countries are [sic] not to be disposed of in Canada and radioactive waste generated in Canada will be disposed of in Canada, with the exception of certain radioactive wastes subject to return arrangements.
The policy lists as exceptions the “repatriation of disused sources to Canada.” It adds that “radioactive sources that were not from Canada may be brought to Canada.”
This is a clear admission that Canada is importing radioactive waste from other countries and intends to continue doing so. The ownership of this waste is eventually transferred to the Government of Canada, and the waste is stored at the federally owned Chalk River Laboratories of AECL.
The financial arrangements involved in these waste transfers are completely non-transparent. In this way, the waste imports could be adding to the liabilities recorded in the Public Accounts of Canada. Canadian taxpayers may be subsidizing not only Canada’s own nuclear industry, but the nuclear industry of foreign nations as well.
Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area 