April 2023
by Ole Hendrickson, Ph.D.
A key takeaway from this briefer is that because they use unenriched uranium as fuel, Canadian nuclear reactors produce roughly ten times more radioactive waste per unit electricity generated, than US nuclear reactors.
by Ole Hendrickson, Ph.D. CCRCA researcher
April 20, 2023
Canada’s Policy for Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning
Background: In 2017, civil society groups were trying to understand how three irresponsible radioactive waste projects (the giant Chalk River mound and two legacy reactor entombments), could be undergoing environmental assessment in Canada. The lack of a substantive federal radioactive waste policy was noted as a serious problem that had allowed the projects to proceed. The policy vacuum was brought to the attention of the IAEA, the Prime Minister, the Auditor General and many other Canadian officials. In September 2019, an international peer review team from IAEA flagged Canada’s lack of a radioactive waste policy as a serious problem. In response, Natural Resources Canada began a review process which took place from 2020 to 2023. The review included extensive involvement from civil society groups and concerned individuals across Canada. The new policy, released in March 2023, is a huge disappointment to many people who, in good faith, worked hard to provide many valuable suggestions only to find their input virtually ignored by the captured bodies (CNSC and NRCan) that developed the policy. In the words of our Quebec colleagues at Ralliement contre la pollution radioactive, the policy is “a fiasco and a slap in the face to democracy.” What follows is a detailed analysis of the many serious failings of Canada’s new “modernized” radioactive waste policy.
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Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) uses “ensure” in its various forms 28 times in the final version of its new radioactive waste policy, up from 14 times in the draft.
Use of “ensure” in a policy context represents an empty promise – a promise that is not associated with any specific action and that lacks a verifiable, measurable, time-bound target. Reliance on such language indicates an intent to avoid further discussion.
For example, NRCan’s claim that Canada could “ensure nuclear non-proliferation” if plutonium reprocessing were to be allowed (and plutonium-fueled reactors were to be exported to other countries) demonstrates the policy’s superficial and specious nature.
The closest thing to a target in the policy is found in one of the “vision” statements:
By 2050, key elements of Canada’s radioactive waste disposal infrastructure are in place, and planning is well under way for the remaining facilities necessary to accommodate all of Canada’s current and future radioactive wastes.
This begs the questions, “What are those “key elements?” and “What are the remaining facilities?” To achieve this rather weak and vague vision:
The federal government accordingly ensures… that responsibility for maintaining institutional controls over the long term, including the preservation of records and knowledge management of radioactive wastes, is assigned, in an open and transparent manner, to an appropriate entity.
It appears that the federal government is unprepared to accept responsibility at this time for managing radioactive waste, even the waste that it has generated. The federal government created the nuclear industry and generated a massive (~ $16 billion) waste liability through R&D work carried out by the crown corporation Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) over the past 75 years. AECL continues to receive annual appropriations exceeding a billion dollars.
The policy only promises that at some indefinite time in the future the government will “ensure” that an “appropriate entity” is created to maintain institutional controls over the long term. This side-steps the key issue of governance. A public entity to oversee radioactive waste management is urgently needed. Hundreds of submissions on the draft policy called for the government to establish an independent oversight body now.
Although the policy gives the nuclear industry free rein in managing its waste, with no oversight, it assigns no real responsibility to the industry, either. It calls upon the industry to develop “conceptual approaches” and to submit an “Integrated Strategy for Canada’s radioactive waste to the federal government for review and consideration.”
An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report prompted the government to undertake a radioactive waste policy review. The IAEA specifically recommended that the government “enhance” the principles contained in its previous Radioactive Waste Policy Framework. The most important principle was “polluter pays”:
The waste producers and owners are responsible, in accordance with the principle of “polluter pays”, for the funding, organization, management and operation of disposal and other facilities required for their wastes.
Rather than being enhanced, this principle was deleted from the new policy. This opens the door to subsidies from the federal government for management of radioactive wastes produced by non-federal entities.
The policy lacks acceptable language regarding assessment of radioactive waste management facilities. NRCan rejected the following civil society proposal:
Amend the Physical Activities Regulations under the Impact Assessment Act to include construction and operation of new nuclear reactors, decommissioning of nuclear reactors, and all phases in the development, operation and closure of long-term waste management facilities.
Instead, NRCan said:
The Policy recognizes and is aligned with federal legislation, particularly the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, the Impact Assessment Act and the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act, as well as other legislation, associated regulations, and other policy tools that further support radioactive waste management,
adding that
These policy tools are regularly reviewed and updated by the federal government, as required, to ensure they remain relevant and effective.
This is a dubious claim, given that the government had not reviewed or updated the previous waste policy “framework” for 27 years, and has not reviewed or updated the Nuclear Safety and Control Act for 26 years.
Stating that the new policy “is aligned with” the Impact Assessment Act fails to mention that the Physical Activities Regulations under this Act exempt decommissioning of reactors and other nuclear facilities, new radioactive waste storage facilities, fuel waste reprocessing facilities with an annual production capacity of less than 100 tonnes of plutonium per year, and construction and operation of small modular reactors (and management of their wastes).
Hence, nearly all major nuclear activities are exempted from assessment.
Most current nuclear decommissioning activities are occurring on federal lands owned by AECL. In theory, impact assessment is required for all projects occurring on federal lands under section 82 of the Impact Assessment Act.
AECL, despite being a federal authority under the Act, ignores decommissioning projects, and delegates the determination of the significance of other waste-related activities (such as a new intermediate-level waste storage facility) to its private contractor, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories. This is not allowed under the Act.
With regard to health, safety and environmental aspects of radioactive waste management, NRCan rejected the following civil society suggestions on the policy draft:
Radioactive waste will be contained and monitored to ensure it remains isolated from the accessible biosphere for the time frame relevant to the category of waste;” and “Prioritize the health, safety and security of people and the environment by requiring that radioactive wastes are kept contained and isolated from the biosphere.”
These suggestions were based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standard for radioactive waste disposal. The IAEA says:
The specific aims of disposal are:
(a) To contain the waste;
(b) To isolate the waste from the accessible biosphere and to reduce substantially the likelihood of, and all possible consequences of, inadvertent human intrusion into the waste;
(c) To inhibit, reduce and delay the migration of radionuclides at any time from the waste to the accessible biosphere;
(d) To ensure that the amounts of radionuclides reaching the accessible biosphere due to any migration from the disposal facility are such that possible radiological consequences are acceptably low at all times.
The new policy does not contain the words “biosphere”, “isolation”, “migration” or “intrusion”, instead substituting vague phrases such as “ensure protection of the environment”. The policy’s failure to commit to isolating waste from the biosphere allows the nuclear industry to use the environment – particularly water bodies – as a way of diluting and disposing of its radioactive waste.
The policy’s failure to commit to isolating waste from the biosphere allows the nuclear industry to use the environment – particularly water bodies – as a way of diluting and disposing of its radioactive waste.
Dilution is the strategy employed by the “NSDF project”, announced by a consortium of multinational companies immediately after the Harper government contracted them to deal with the 75-year accumulation of radioactive waste at AECL’s nuclear sites across Canada. The NSDF would be Canada’s first permanent disposal facility for radioactive waste from nuclear reactors – a million-cubic-meter mound of waste next to the Ottawa River, including a pipeline that would discharge partially-treated leachate from the mound into a lake that drains into the river. It would set a terrible precedent for future facilities.
First Nations have expressed serious concerns about the NSDF project and two other permanent disposal projects that involve entombing AECL prototype reactors in concrete and grout and abandoning them next to the Ottawa and Winnipeg Rivers.
After the public comment period on the draft policy, a new section was added entitled “Canada’s commitment towards building partnerships and advancing reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.” It calls for “early, continuous and meaningful engagement” in future radioactive waste projects. However, the policy is silent on the question of whether the current disposal projects – announced without that early engagement – could be approved without the free, prior and informed consent of First Nations. Nor does the new policy commit to First Nations “consent” for future projects.
Another new section, entitled “Scope of the Policy,” adds confusion about reprocessing and fails to address Canada’s experimental work with plutonium fuels. The language on reprocessing says:
Reprocessing, the purpose of which would be to extract fissile material from nuclear fuel waste for further use, is not presently employed in Canada, and so is outside the scope of this Policy.
However, the federally-owned Recycle Fuel Fabrication Laboratories have been conducting plutonium fuel research for many years. Furthermore the government has given a private company $50.5 million to develop a commercial reprocessing facility under the guise of waste “recycling”.
Despite thousands of letters requesting a ban on plutonium reprocessing in the policy and noting the dangers of this technology for nuclear weapons proliferation, the word “plutonium” appears nowhere. Claiming that reprocessing is “outside the scope” of a radioactive waste policy is irresponsible. Furthermore, a new phrase in section 1.7 of the final policy encourages “recycling and reuse of materials.” This could be read as promoting “recycling” of used fuel to extract plutonium.
Also highly problematic is the following phrase in the new policy:
The government of Canada remains deeply committed to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remains the only legally binding global treaty promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. State Parties to this treaty “undertake never under any circumstances to… Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
While Canada may refuse to acknowledge the existence of the TPNW, this does not alter the fact that the international community has acted to ban nuclear weapons.
The section on “Scope of the Policy” also contains contradictory and confusing wording on naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM). The IAEA says NORM is “Radioactive material containing no significant amounts of radionuclides other than naturally occurring radionuclides.” The IAEA definition explicitly includes “Material in which the activity concentrations of the naturally occurring radionuclides have been changed by a process.”
In contrast, the new policy defines NORM as “material found in the environment that contains radioactive elements of natural origin.” This would appear to exclude from the policy the waste that is created when NORM is extracted from the environment and then processed.
The CNSC regulates many facilities that process NORM (using the internationally agreed definition): uranium mines, Cameco’s processing facilities in Blind River and Port Hope, fuel fabrication facilities, etc. The new policy also says:
“this Policy does not address NORM other than those associated with the development, production or use of nuclear energy or technologies and those associated with the transport and import/export of nuclear substances.”
This statement is both grammatically incorrect (NORM refers to “material”, not “materials”) and does not adequately address the contradiction inherent in defining NORM in a manner that excludes the many processing activities occurring in Canada, and the wastes they generate.
The terms “process” and “processing” appear nowhere in the policy. Even the word “uranium” is absent from the policy, further illustrating the superficial nature of the new policy.
Also problematic is the reference to “an independent nuclear regulator that makes decisions using inclusive, open, and transparent public hearings.” Self-serving promotion of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission does not belong in a radioactive waste policy. Claims of transparency and openness do not match reality. The real issue is that the CNSC invariably dismisses public input in making its decisions.
Public input has also been dismissed in this new policy. It reads as if it was written by the CNSC, which may be true. The CNSC is widely considered to be completely “captured” by the nuclear industry, with a revolving door between CNSC, the nuclear industry, and Natural Resources Canada.
The policy rejects the demand by civil society organizations for a ban on imports of radioactive waste from other countries. It says that the federal government:
is committed to the principle that radioactive waste generated in other countries are [sic] not to be disposed of in Canada and radioactive waste generated in Canada will be disposed of in Canada, with the exception of certain radioactive wastes subject to return arrangements.
The policy lists as exceptions the “repatriation of disused sources to Canada.” It adds that “radioactive sources that were not from Canada may be brought to Canada.”
This is a clear admission that Canada is importing radioactive waste from other countries and intends to continue doing so. The ownership of this waste is eventually transferred to the Government of Canada, and the waste is stored at the federally owned Chalk River Laboratories of AECL.
The financial arrangements involved in these waste transfers are completely non-transparent. In this way, the waste imports could be adding to the liabilities recorded in the Public Accounts of Canada. Canadian taxpayers may be subsidizing not only Canada’s own nuclear industry, but the nuclear industry of foreign nations as well.
April 2022
The International Atomic Energy Agency says that radioactive waste facilities must be carefully sited and waste placed below ground to keep radioactive materials out of air and water and protect current and future generations. The IAEA says that siting is a fundamentally important activity in the disposal of radioactive waste. Location of a disposal facility in a “stable geological formation” provides protection from processes such as erosion and glaciation. It says that nuclear reactor entombment should only be used in the case of a “severe accident”, such as a meltdown.
Retired AECL scientists say that IAEA guidance must be followed, that Canada has an obligation to follow the guidelines as a signatory to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
First Nations, in a Joint Declaration, endorsed by resolution at the Assembly of First Nations, say that nuclear waste should be managed according to five principles: 1) no abandonment, 2) monitored and retrievable storage 3) better containment, more packaging, 2) away from drinking water and major water bodies and 5) no unnecessary transport (exports and imports)
The Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility says radioactive waste should be carefully managed in monitored and retrievable condition so that repairs to packaging can be made as needed, to keep the contents out of the biosphere, our air, soil and drinking water. The CCNR suggests that a “rolling stewardship” strategy whereby each generation teaches each subsequent generation how to look after the wastes and keep them out of the biosphere.
Some countries such as Finland have made good progress building facilities to keep radioactive waste out of the biosphere. Finland puts low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes produced by its four nuclear reactors in bedrock geological facilities 100 meters deep. It has over 25 years of experience with these facilities. They will also house the radioactive remains of the reactors when they are shut down and dismantled.
April 14, 2022 (Updated May 13, 2022)
IAEA Safety Guide SSG-29, Appendix 1, Siting of Near Surface Disposal Facilities, says siting is a “fundamentally important activity in the disposal of radioactive waste.” (Ref: https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1637_web.pdf, p. 83)
SSG-29 says the first two stages in the siting process are a “conceptual and planning stage,” during which “projected waste volumes and activities should be quantified,” and an “area survey stage,” involving “regional mapping or investigation.”
The NSDF facility type and site were selected without quantifying volumes and activities of federal wastes awaiting disposal, and without a regional investigation, thus skipping the first two stages identified in the IAEA Safety Guide.
Proximity to contaminated structures being demolished at the Chalk River Laboratories — not safety or environmental protection — appears to have been the priority is choosing the site of the NSDF. No serious consideration was given to sites other than those on AECL’s 3700-ha Chalk River property,
Alternative sites should be sought to avoid rapid discharge of radioactive and hazardous substances to a major water body and to avoid placing wastes in an area with a high water table (Ref: CMD 22-H7, Section 3.2, Design Options Evaluation).
Flat, sandy portions of the 30,770-ha Department of National Defence Garrison Petawawa property, adjacent to the Chalk River Laboratories, would accommodate a larger, less expensive, and safer in-ground concrete vault facility. Vegetation was removed from extensive portions of this property to create a parachute training zone for the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which was disbanded in 1995.
A regional investigation of crown land for geological formations suitable for a shallow rock cavern facility should also be conducted.
IAEA Safety Requirement SSR-5, Disposal of Radioactive Waste, indicates that an in-ground concrete vault or a shallow rock cavern could contain a wider range of waste types than an above ground, landfill-type facility such as the NSDF. (Ref: https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1449_web.pdf)
The southern portion of the site chosen for the NSDF is underlain by a feature categorized in 1994 as a ““high-probability” fracture zone,” ten meters wide and over a kilometer long – a potential groundwater flow pathway with “permeability values several orders of magnitude greater than bulk rock mass.” (Ref: https://www.iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/evaluations/document/139596, p.5-109).This feature should have eliminated the proposed site from further consideration.
Original site selection criteria announced by the proponent would have excluded any site with more than a 10% slope. This criterion was changed to 25% to allow CNL’s desired site (Ref: Near Surface Disposal Facility Site Selection Report 232-10300-TN-001 Revision 2. Oct. 2016). .
Site selection criteria were also supposed to exclude known or proposed critical habitats for species listed under the Federal Species at Risk Act (SARA) or by the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC).” However, construction of the NSDF would destroy 30 hectares of mature and semi-mature forest that provides high-quality maternity roosting habitat for three endangered bat species (Little Brown Myotis, Northern Myotis and Tri-colored Bat) and nesting habitat for six at-risk bird species (Canada Warbler, Golden-winged Warbler, Wood Thrush, Eastern Wood Pewee, Whip-poor-will, Wood Thrush). It would also have adverse impacts on at-risk aquatic species such as the Blanding’s Turtle.
The proposed NSDF site is on a hillside, over fractured rock, with a high water table, surrounded on three sides by wetlands that drain into Perch Lake 50 metres from the base of the hill. Perch Creek flows from Perch Lake into the Ottawa River, one kilometre away. The entire Chalk River Laboratories property — with its proximity to the Ottawa River, high groundwater table, uneven terrain, and fractured bedrock — is a very poor location for permanent radioactive waste disposal. The NSDF would destroy habitat for many at-risk species. Volumes and activities of federal wastes were not quantified prior to selection of a landfill-type disposal facility, so there is no certainty that the NSDF could safely accommodate a significant portion of these wastes.
This is why concerned citizens say this is the “Wrong Plan” in the “Wrong Place”.
21 février 2022
La Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire (CCSN) a commis une erreur massive dans un document qu’elle a préparé pour une audience du 22 février pour autoriser un monticule géant de déchets radioactifs près de la rivière des Outaouais, à 180 km en amont de la capitale du Canada.
La présentation de la CCSN (diapositive 23) montre la radioactivité du monticule tombant sous la radioactivité des roches environnantes entre 10 et 100 ans après la fermeture de l’installation fédérale de gestion des déchets.
Mais la bande grise montrant la radioactivité des roches de la région est fausse – environ 1 000 fois trop élevée.
« C’est très inquiétant, car la Commission est le seul organisme au Canada à superviser l’industrie nucléaire et à contrôler la sécurité de ses activités », a déclaré Ole Hendrickson, PhD, scientifique et chercheur pour Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area. “Les colis dans le monticule seront plus radioactifs que la grande majorité des échantillons de minerai, même dans 10 000 ans.”
La CCSN utilise la « gamme de radioactivité dans les roches » erronée pour conclure que le dépotoir de déchets radioactifs ne poserait pas de risque important à long terme pour la santé du public et recommande d’autoriser sa construction.
L’organisme de réglementation nucléaire du Canada a passé quatre ans à évaluer la proposition pour une « installation de gestion des déchets près de la surface (IGDPS)» des Laboratoires Nucléaires Canadiens (LNC), mais n’a pas réussi à détecter l’erreur de plusieurs ordres de grandeur.
Le monticule comprendra des déchets emballés à vie longue avec jusqu’à 10 000 000 de Becquerels par kilogramme de radioactivité. Cela signifie que 10 millions d’atomes se désintègrent – émettant une rafale de rayonnement – chaque seconde par kilo. Le dépotoir contiendrait plus d’un million de tonnes de déchets.
Dans sa proposition, les LNC ont également calculé une « dose d’ingestion » et ont conclu qu’il serait plus sécuritaire de manger des déchets dans le monticule que de manger du minerai d’uranium local, environ dix ans après la fermeture du dépotoir.
La diapositive de la CCSN fait référence à un rapport de 1981 de la Commission géologique de l’Ontario. Même l’échantillon le plus radioactif du rapport serait beaucoup moins radioactif que la bande grise prétendant montrer une « gamme de radioactivité dans les roches » dans la région de Pembroke-Renfrew. Cet échantillon aberrant (avec 1100 ppm d’uranium) a été trouvé près du lac Merchands, à 100 km de Chalk River.
Le rapport a analysé 74 échantillons et en a trouvé 67 avec de faibles niveaux, de 1 à 100 parties par million, d’uranium.
L’erreur apparaît d’abord dans le dossier de sureté préparé par le promoteur du monticule. Les Laboratoires Nucléaires Canadiens (LNC) sont une société privée engagée par le gouvernement fédéral en 2015 pour exploiter des installations nucléaires appartenant à la société d’État fédérale Énergie atomique du Canada limitée (EACL). Le dossier de sûreté est le principal document utilisé par la CCSN pour prendre une décision de permis.
Hendrickson a ajouté : « La répétition de l’erreur massive des LNC soulève des doutes majeurs quant à la crédibilité de l’évaluation par la CCSN des risques du projet. »
Gordon Edwards, January 12, 2021
Uranium enrichment is indeed a proliferation-sensitive technology as is clearly demonstrated by the Iranian situation. Even though, under the terms of the NPT and all other international accords, Iran has the right to enrich uranium to any degree that might be desired, for civilian purposes only, in practical terms the western powers do not at all trust Iran to exercise that right. So they are prohibited from doing so, even to the 20% (minus epsilon) level, which is what many of the proposed SMNR designs require.
Right up until the final shutdown of the NRU reactor at Chalk River, Canada was using weapons-grade uranium (>93%) targets for the production of technetium-99m generators for use in hospitals around the world, and I was told by an Iranian scientist in Salzburg that Iran wanted weapons-grade uranium for exactly the same reason – medical isotopes. All of this ignoring the fact that weapons-grade uranium is NOT needed for this purpose, whether in Canada or anywhere else, and in actual fact technetium-99m generators can be produced in a cost-effective manner without the use of a nuclear reactor of any kind, or even using uranium of any kind.
But – in the interests of a nuclear weapons free world – Canada should indeed be encouraging the international / multinational control (or oversight) of ALL enrichment facilities.
But that is small potatoes. Canada claims the NPT is the backbone of its non-proliferation commitment, but India has not signed the NPT and has already developed a nuclear weapons capability beginning in 1974 with plutonium produced in a Canadian reactor (the CIRUS, a clone of the NRX). Whereupon Canada insisted there would be no more nuclear cooperation between Canada and India – but all the time, India remained a member of COG (the CANDU Owners Group) and went on to build more than a dozen CANDU “clones” without direct Canadian help (other than the fact that we sold them under very generous terms the original CANDUS that were the cookie-cutter models for all the others. And then, under Stephen Harper, we resumed sales of uranium to India without any requirement that they get rid of their nuclear arsenal or even stop expanding it, and without signing the NPT. Which makes all the other countries who signed the NPT to have access to Canadian uranium and/or technology look like fools, because India got all the goodies without accepting the NPT responsibilities. Canada should stop selling uranium to India if the NPT is really so important.
But even that is small potatoes. Article VI of the NPT says that the “ official nuclear weapons states USA, UK, France, Russia and China, must negotiate in good faith not only to eliminate nuclear weapons but to achieve general and complete disarmament (i.e. elimination of armies and an end to war). Clearly, none of these nuclear superpowers are embarked on such a path, and until they do, Canada should refuse to sell uranium to any of them. Or at least should put constant pressure on the, to comply with Article VI. The fact that these things are not done indicates that Canada is only paying lip-service when it says that NPT is the basis for its non-proliferation policies.
PET told the UN General Assembly that if we want a world free of nuclear weapons, we must end the arms race – and we must begin with a strategy of suffocation, to choke off the vital oxygen on which it feeds, meaning the production of the two “strategic nuclear materials” which serve as primary nuclear explosives, i.e. weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade plutonium.
These same considerations should apply when it comes to the extraction of plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel. At the very least, there should be a requirement for such facilities (reprocessing plants) to be under international control just as enrichment plants should be under international control. Of course, better yet would be the abolition of reprocessing and uranium enrichment altogether, taking Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s 1978 “strategy of suffocation” to its ultimate limit. PET told the UN General Assembly that if we want a world free of nuclear weapons, we must end the arms race – and we must begin with a strategy of suffocation, to choke off the vital oxygen on which it feeds, meaning the production of the two “strategic nuclear materials” which serve as primary nuclear explosives, i.e. weapons-grade uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. However we now know that, for weapons purposes, ALL plutonium is “good” plutonium, so the division of plutonium into weapons-grade and non-weapons-grade is illusory. Ultimately, then, the strategy of suffocation means no nuclear reactors whatsoever.
See www.ccnr.org/plute_sandia.html
The NSDF “Licensed Inventory” (Table 13 in the NSDF Waste Acceptance Criteria), if followed by the proponent, would only allow disposal of a tiny fraction of the Government of Canada’s legacy nuclear waste. The NSDF would yield virtually no reduction in the federal nuclear legacy liability despite the expenditure of hundreds of millions of tax dollars.
Liabilities could also increase, because a giant pile of leaking radioactive waste would be difficult to remediate, and remediation costs could exceed those of managing the wastes had they not been put in the mound.
For a detailed analysis see this post: https://concernedcitizens.net/2020/10/06/the-government-of-canadas-radioactive-wastes-costs-and-liabilities-growing-under-public-private-partnership/
by Dr. Gordon Edwards, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility
December 19, 2020
Civilian nuclear and military nuclear have always been friendly room-mates, members of a “mutual admiration” society. In today’s announcement of an SMR Action Plan, Natural Resources Minister Seamus O’Regan said that nuclear power in Canada is a “home-grown” technology and referred to C. D. Howe’s role in this connection. In fact C.D. Howe arranged for all Canadian uranium extracted from Canadian mines to be sold to the US military for use in tens of thousands of nuclear weapons from 1945 to 1965. C D Howe was also on the Committee that met in Washington DC in 1944 to approve the first nuclear reactors to be built in Canada (at Chalk River) as part of the ongoing effort to produce plutonium for use as a nuclear explosive. Mr. Howe approved of the policy of selling plutonium produced at Chalk River to the US military for weapons use, a practice that continued until 1975 and beyond. Plutonium from Chalk River was sent to Britain (it was the first sample of plutonium that Britain had ever obtained) just a few months before Britain detonated its first A-Bomb in the Monte Bello Islands off Australia.
To the best of my knowledge, no civilian nuclear power agency – not the Canadian Nuclear Association, nor the Canadian Nuclear Society, nor the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, nor Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, nor Canadian Nuclear Laboratories, NOBODY – has ever issued a clear statement denouncing nuclear weapons or even calling for a nuclear weapons free world. Most nuclear scientists and engineers feel a strong kinship and camaraderie with those who are in the nuclear weapons business. The same goes for those in the nuclear division of Natural Resources Canada. I remember on one occasion (prior to the exchange of nuclear tests between India and Pakistan) I expressed alarm at the fact that both neighbours are developing a nuclear war-fighting capability and a couple of senior civil servants said “Would that be so bad? Maybe that’s just what the world needs. More deterrence. Creates stability”
Despite regular denials from our puppet masters that civilian nuclear has nothing to do with military nuclear, it is clear that civilian nuclear (including the frankly discriminatory provisions of the NPT) has adopted an appeasement policy that will never succeed in bringing about a nuclear weapons free world. Why does Canada continue to sell uranium to countries that are in the process of investing hundreds of billions to improve and modernize the nuclear arsenals in utter defiance of the NPT, knowing that the vast bulk of Canadian uranium that is rejected from enrichment plants as DU end up as the raw material for producing plutonium for Bombs, and that the lion’s share of the explosive power – and the overwhelming share of the radioactive fallout – of every H-bomb comes from the fissioning of DU atoms that are freely accessed by the military even if they are the leftovers of “peaceful” fuel production for nuclear power plants?
“See ‘The Nuclear Fudge’ at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lK65S5eHRQ&feature=youtu.be“. This 16-minute W5 segment from the Regan era is very informative. The photo below is a screen shot from the video.
Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area 